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A man under siege! A man under attack! An angry man! They say angry men are dangerous men. 
In recent years I have tried modestly 
to help fill a void by focussing on 
leadership, specifically international 
political leadership, and a country’s 
domestic and international fortunes. 
Recent months have seen a confluence 
of circumstances and events that have 
led to the recent decision by some 
members of the African National 
Congress (ANC) National Executive 
Committee (NEC) calling on President 
Zuma to resign. For this meeting, 
the president’s base and his ardent 
supporters were rallied to help stave 
off the call. 
After the extended ANC NEC 
meeting at the end of November 
2016, the ANC released a statement 
asserting that the real threats to the 
revolution in South Africa are “racism, 
ethnic nationalism and monopoly 
capital”. It was the emphasis on ethnic 
nationalism that struck a cord and 
in recent months we have witnessed 
increasing interest in and focus on 
the leadership styles and travails of 
President Jacob Zuma. A kragdadige 
(forceful), at times belligerent ethnic 
nationalism has played itself out as 
the President sought to deal with his 
challenges, travails and detractors and 
fight to restore his credibility. 
In a riveting piece about President 
Zuma, ANC stalwart and veteran 
Mavuso Msimang wrote in an article in 
the City Press newspaper in November 
2015 that President Zuma “is a very 
angry man”. Msimang wrote this piece 
in reaction to President Zuma’s off the 
cuff, unscripted words during an ANC 
Provincial conference. In that speech, 
Zuma launched a “visceral attack 
on Kgalema Mothlante”. Motlanthe 
made the mistake of criticising certain 
practices in the ANC, including 
corruption and factionalism. The 
former president quickly learned that 
the president did not take kindly to 
criticism of the ANC, the “collective” 
as he sees it, and less still criticism of 
him as president or person, as he is 
part of “the collective”. He detests 
being removed from the collective and 
being singled out, for snakes are killed 
by chopping off the head. When he is 
targeted as the “head” he feels he is 
being likened to a snake; a bad omen 
in his culture. 
Just when I thought this was an 
exception and not the rule I had 
to remind myself that, after being 
“relieved” of his duties in 2005 as 
Deputy President, Jacob Zuma went 
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to Kwazulu-Natal to bully-pulpit so as 
to reinforce his base and build up and 
consolidate his devotees. So when in 
November 2016 the president delivered 
another truculent, unscripted speech in 
KwaZulu-Natal, and this time round in 
his address to thousands of supporters 
at the ANC’s victory rally in eDumbe, 
it was suggestive of a peculiar pattern 
that developed. Zuma vowed that he 
was “not scared of political parties who 
approach courts to scare” him. Said the 
Big Chief, “people think democracy is 
done at courts. They never mention 
the will of the people, they always talk 
about courts…They think by going to 
courts they are intimidating the ANC”. 
A pugnacious, belligerent side revealed 
itself when he warned his detractors: 
“we are not going to be intimidated 
even if it means I get arrested today. I 
am used to it. I have spent a lot of time 
in jail. You cannot threaten me with jail 
time. I am not scared of jail time. I have 
been there”.  
I sat up and became increasingly 
intrigued by this curious style of 
Number 1, not just when he speaks 
unscripted and from the “heart” so 
to speak, without a text and with his 
mind really going political, but by his 
resorting to cultural and ethnic politics 
when he chooses KwaZulu-Natal as 
the base to go and deliver combative 
off the cuff speeches. Here is a man 
that has always been in touch with his 
traditional, cultural base, and when he 
feels he has his back to the wall, he 
goes back to the base for inspiration 
and support. The role of personality 
matters in politics, and speeches in both 
content and tone, and how the leader 
connects with popular constituencies 
can give one a true sense of someone’s 
leadership style. 
During the years 2015-16, it 
became plain that South Africa was 
searching for relevance and purpose 
in world affairs. The politics at home 
appeared feeble with the ruling ANC 
experiencing major internal challenges 
and its leader, President Zuma, finding 
himself bogged down in a number of 
political scandals and disgraces. The 
Constitutional Court ruled in March 
2016 that the President was acting in 
ways that were outside the  spirit and the 
letter of the constitution. The currency 
see-sawed at the hands of amorphous 
“markets” amid speculation about the 
future of the President.
The ruling party appeared to 
have lost its political and strategic 
compass nationally and this sense 
of misdirection at home appears to 
have spilled over into the Republic’s 
foreign affairs. South Africa has lost 
international respect and its sense of 
balance in global affairs, and when 
probed the issue of the leadership of 
the head of state is questioned.  
On 18 November 2016, President 
Zuma again went to Pietermaritzburg 
in the heartland of his strong base in 
KwaZula-Natal, and gave another 
one of those frank, and combative 
speeches. The President again openly 
expressed the view that the reason 
why we find ourselves in a global spot 
of bother was two-fold: he is not liked 
by some at home, including many in 
close ANC ranks, and that the ANC and 
South Africa are “not liked” globally. 
The President appealed for sympathy. 
He played the politics of victimhood 
and wanted his base to understand 
that he was being persecuted and 
tormented by enemies.  
The President sharpened his 
tongue for those veterans who dared 
to challenge his authority and had 
the temerity to do so outside of ANC 
structures. He also belted former 
President Thabo Mbeki for a letter in 
which he implored Zuma to meet with 
the 101 veterans and stalwarts that was 
leaked to the media even before he 
received it. 
International forces were not 
spared the President’s ire. The reason 
why we are “not liked”, according 
to the President, is because we are 
“independent” and we “chose to join 
the BRICS group”. Said the President, 
“most people do not like us because 
we cannot be told what to do”. BRICS 
is “a small group but is very powerful” 
and this constellation “had interfered 
with the global balance of forces” and 
“western forces did not like BRICS”. 
President Zuma did not stop there. 
He argued that ratings agencies were 
part of the “arsenal being used by 
countries seeking to smash the BRICS 
alliance”. This sounded like Kraal 
leadership not confined to domestic 
politics but also applied to BRICS and 
the Russian nuclear deal and heckling 
critics were urged to back off their 
continuous strident criticism of ANC 
and government politics.  
How true is it that South Africa’s 
dwindling influence in world affairs, 
and the growing lack of respect, is the 
result of it being punished by the West 
for having had the audacity to join 
BRICS? There is no doubt that there is a 
sense of irritation on the part of the West 
for South Africa’s perceived pivoting to 
China and outreach to Russia in search 
of a special and distinctive entente. 
Many in the West still believe that the 
fulcrum of South Africa’s foreign affairs 
is with the West. The ANC is within 
its right to strengthening ties with 
Brazil, India, China and the broader 
South, and to stress that it believes in 
an “Africa first” policy. Ambivalence 
and criticism towards the “West” is 
understandable; but to use a foreign 
policy issue for kraal leadership to 
rally and mobilise the political base 
is a novelty in South African politics. 
Just as it becomes difficult to restore 
international confidence in its faltering 
economy, it became increasingly 
difficult to make sense of the Republic’s 
domestic politics and global standing. 
The trivialisation of politics at home 
and personalisation of foreign policy 
appears to be a desperate quest by the 
Big Chief to restore his and the ANC’s 
leadership and repair their dented 
prestige and reputation nationally and 
in world affairs. 
This quest for embrace by the world 
and search for global status has revealed 
a crisis of confidence in the Republic’s 
international affairs. All the bravado 
and at times defiance of its posture 
notwithstanding, the crisis at home 
appears to have spilled over into a crisis 
of conviction in foreign policy and 
diplomacy. South Africa’s diplomacy 
and international relations could not 
escape the tormenting web of divisive 
and conflict-ridden slate politics that 
have come to beset the ANC. Foreign 
policy is now an extension of slanting 
regime politics. 
South Africa’s foreign policy appears 
to be caught between issues of liberation 
brotherhoods/sisterhoods and solidarity, 
the quest for national interests, and 
adhering to lofty, cosmopolitan, liberal 
values.  While the rhetoric of foreign 
policy has an increasingly pro-Africa, 
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pro-Asia [read: pro-China], pro-South, 
and pro-multilateralism posture, and 
conversely an anti-US, and west, and 
anti-imperialism stance, the reality is 
that it is much closer to western powers 
than it cares to admit and recognise, 
while showing a palpable shift in its ties 
with Asia and South America. One of 
the motivations for its membership in 
Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa 
(BRICS) congregation for example is the 
idea of being a member of a “big club” 
that will help it to punch above its weight 
in foreign affairs, and help to enhance its 
prestige in world affairs. While President 
Zuma is of the view that South Africa 
is a “big player” in BRICS, others doubt 
whether South Africa is earning its keep 
in foreign policy.   
Our foreign policy remains one that 
is driven by regime and self-interest 
considerations. In the 2015 ANC 
foreign policy discussion document, 
there is no reference at all to human 
rights, suggesting that the ANC, at 
least under President Zuma, is crafting 
a post-human rights international 
relations posture. The African 
continent’s woes are all laid at the door 
of exogenous factors as “imperialism 
and neo-colonial forces”, according to 
the ANC, “are responsible for the wave 
of social instability in our continent”. 
There is scarcely any reference to 
endogenous factors.  
The Zuma government went to the 
extent of arguing that “the national 
interest” is the doctrine that would 
inform the country’s foreign policy. But 
in the realpolitik, self-interested world 
of President Zuma’s government, the 
national interest seem to have become 
a cover for regime interests and self-
interest in an increasingly utilitarian, 
economic driven foreign policy that is 
pursued under the banner “Open for 
business…In a big way!”.   
Laissez-Faire foreign policy decision-
making of a Big Chief of Africa
In order to understand the current 
perplexing standing of South Africa 
in world affairs, we have to zero in 
more on the Polokwanisation of South 
African foreign policy decision-making. 
The fault-lines and deviations in South 
Africa’s foreign policy can best be 
explained by the haphazard manner 
in which policy is arrived at, based on 
the fact that, just as government in the 
main has become factionliased and full 
of slates, so foreign policy reflects these 
unsettling trends. The bureaucracy and 
diplomatic machinery have become 
highly politicised, and the state and 
foreign policy apparatus has been on 
“auto pilot” for quite some time, with 
no epi-centre evident to drive strategic 
decision-making. Whereas the ANC was 
concerned with the emergence of two 
centres of power when President Mbeki 
was recalled in 2008, now multiple 
centres of power have emerged with no 
clear strategic centre of gravity.  
During the past seven years policy-
making and foreign policy formulation 
have been the result of a diffused and 
scattered, hurly-burly process. Just like 
with other aspects of the state and 
decision-making, foreign policy and 
diplomacy became characterised by 
fissures and frictions because of factional 
politics in the ANC after the deeply 
divisive Polokwane congress which 
resulted in the defeat of Thabo Mbeki, 
and his eventual recall in September 
2007. The lack of strategic management 
of foreign policy and diplomacy became 
palpable after these developments.
Over the past year ANC Secretary-
General Gwede Mantashe and 
President Jacob Zuma himself 
have bemoaned divisions and 
factionalisation in the ruling ANC. 
Foreign policy and diplomacy appear 
to have become a highly factionalised 
muddle, in which there is very 
little that is predictable. The much 
debated ANC foreign policy discussion 
document came about because of this 
laissez faire style as different groups 
and factions in the ANC could not 
agree on what would be the final 
draft of the document that should see 
the light of day.  Jacob Zuma is not a 
hands-on, policy president; nor a nuts-
and-bolts foreign policy manager. This 
management style has spilled over into 
the realm of foreign policy where there 
is a real sense of vacuum and free-
for-all paradigm at play.  
During the past seven years one 
finds it difficult to locate the traces 
of the much-promised networking, 
consultative style of foreign policy as 
promised by president Zuma when 
he ran for president in 2009. We 
have instead seen a situation in which 
powerful interest groups have sought 
to gain access to a national interest-
driven, utilitarian foreign policy that 
has as its main goal economic gains. 
Conclusion
South Africa is struggling to find 
stability and cohesion at home and 
searching for a role and relevance 
in world affairs, and has sent many 
contradictory identity signals in this 
regard. The contradictory messaging 
in domestic and foreign policies has 
often resulted in the articulation of 
incongruous national and foreign 
policy postures by the Republic given 
the slate politics and factionalism in the 
ruling party.  
Just as the Big Chief knows how to 
speak from both sides of his mouth, so 
South Africa has in recent years spoken 
with forked tongues in diplomacy, 
as different strategic documents say 
different and even contradictory things 
about the same issue. 
In recent years and months we have 
witnessed growing tensions between 
self-interest and regime interests on 
the one hand, and lofty cosmopolitan 
values proclaimed to be central tenets 
of our domestic politics and foreign 
policy. These tensions are increasingly 
being played out in the realist, 
utilitarian, scorched-earth politics 
of Jacob Zuma, the man and the 
president. Here we have a cunning, 
crafty and wily old fox who uses the 
traditional base to manipulate his way 
through the turbulence and turmoil of 
politics as the underdog and the victim. 
Welcome to Zuma’s kraal! The Kraal of 
zero-sum politics.  ■
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